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NOTES
SCHIAVONE v. FORTUNE: A CLARIFICATION OF
THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE
Although often accorded a heightened expectation of competence by the
general public, attorneys are not infallible. Notwithstanding their special-
ized education and training, practitioners inevitably make mistakes, this fact
being most clearly manifest in pleadings and filings. Without the means to
adequately amend pleadings and correct errors, attorneys would be relegated
to playing a highly technical game, with the winner being the more skillful
pleader, not the more meritorious litigant.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 exists as one safeguard against this
consequence. Subsection (c) of this rule was initially adopted to prevent the
statute of limitations from barring a claim where, although the wrong party
had been sued, the intended party nevertheless had been given sufficient no-
tice of the commencement of the suit.' Under amended rule 15(c), a claim is
deemed to "relate back" to the date of the original pleading if it arose out of
the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" as the initial claim.2 This
concept of "relation back" permits the new claim or matter to be treated as
if it was timely filed as part of the original pleading, thus avoiding the statute
of limitations bar.3
1. Amended rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent
part:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the origi-
nal pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An
amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the
foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commenc-
ing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received
such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintain-
ing his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been
brought against him.
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Dutka v. Southern Ry., 92 F.R.D. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1981). See Hampton
v. Hanrahan, 522 F. Supp. 140, 143 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Bloomfield Mechanical Contracting, Inc.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1257, 1262 (3d Cir. 1975) (pur-
pose of relation back rule is to ensure that statute of limitations will not mechanically prevent
litigation where real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to proceedings).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
3. Commentators have noted that rule 15(c) is based on the premise that once a suit has
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While the importance to litigation of a clearly defined deadline for the
filing of actions is undisputed, equally important are the policy considera-
tions underlying the judgment of pleadings on the merits.4 It is this dichot-
omy that is at issue in the disposition of cases involving rule 15(c) motions.
Realizing the necessity of precision in creating the standards for balancing
these policy considerations and recognizing the inconsistencies in the rule's
applications resulting from imprecise language, the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules suggested altering rule 15(c).' Thus, in 1966 the rule was
amended in an attempt to promote uniformity in the federal courts in the
application of relation back to an amendment changing parties after the ex-
piration of the statute of limitations.6
Despite the expansion and clarification of the rule, however, inconsisten-
cies in interpretations persisted.7 A major conflict among the federal circuits
focused on the rule's requirement that the new party receive notice "within
the period provided by law for commencing the action against him."8 The
Supreme Court, although it had previously made general pronouncements
been commenced the parties are not protected by the statute of limitations against the later
assertion by amendment of defenses or claims arising out of the same conduct, transaction, or
occurrence as the initial claim. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE CIVIL § 1496 (Supp. 1986). See Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 738
(9th Cir. 1982) (amendment can relate back to time-barred complaint since existence of affirm-
ative defense has no effect on whether notice has been given to opposing party). But see Doe v.
O'Bannon, 91 F.R.D. 442, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (relation back may never operate to enlarge or
restrict federal jurisdiction). Accord USM Corp. v. GKN Fasteners Ltd., 578 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.
1978).
4. See Schiavone v. Fortune, a.k.a. Time, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986); see also Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note, 39 F.R.D. 82 (1966).
6. Id. The Advisory Committee states that "Rule 15(c) is amplified to state more clearly
when an amendment of a pleading changing the party against whom a claim is asserted (in-
cluding an amendment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant) shall 'relate
back' to the date of the original pleading." Id.
The Advisory Committee's Note indicates that the primary reason for the 1966 amendment
was to counter the unjust results in situations where the wrong government agency was being
sued and plaintiff moved to amend after the expiration of the limitations period. The unfair-
ness resulted because of the unusually short limitations period applied in suits against govern-
ment agencies. Rule 15(c) as amended applies equally, however, in cases involving
nongovernmental defendants where an amendment seeks to correct an error in pleading. Id. at
83.
7. Compare Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1984);
Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984); Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Chem. Co., 724 F.2d 68, 70-71 (8th Cir. 1983); and Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56,
58 (7th Cir. 1982) (all literally applied strict notice requirement) with Ringrose v. Engleberg
Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 410 (6th Cir. 1982); Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir.
1980); and Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940
(1979) (notice not required within statutory time period).
8. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c).
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about the function of pleadings, finally sought to resolve this conflict in
Schiavone v. Fortune.9
In Schiavone, the plaintiffs filed their complaints in federal court on May
9, 1983 instituting libel actions under the court's diversity jurisdiction.' °
Those complaints, naming "Fortune" as the sole defendant, alleged that the
magazine libeled each of the plaintiffs in a published article." The applica-
ble statute of limitations required that the complaint be filed on or before
May 19, 1983.12 Plaintiffs described the intended defendant, "Fortune," as
" 'a foreign corporation having its principle offices at Time and Life Build-
ing, Sixth Avenue and 50th Street, New York, New York 10020.' ""3 What
the plaintiff did not realize, however, was that " 'Fortune' was only a trade-
mark and the name of an internal division of Time, Incorporated (Time), a
New York corporation."'
14
On May 20, 1983, plaintiffs mailed their complaints to the registered agent
for Time in New Jersey. Although they were received on May 23, 1983,
Time's agent refused service because Time was not specifically named as a
party.' 5 Plaintiffs, therefore, amended their complaints on July 19, 1983 to
charge "Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated" as defendant instead of
9. 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986).
10. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 750 F.2d 15, 16 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2379
(1986). This suit, arising out of an allegedly libelous article published in Fortune Magazine, is
of considerable contemporary significance. One of the plaintiffs, former Secretary of Labor
Raymond J. Donovan, was indicted for fraud in a current case which is now at trial in the
Bronx, New York Supreme Court and is receiving substantial journalistic commentary.
Donovan, along with eight business associates, was charged with cheating the New York
City Transit Authority out of $7.4 million by juggling funds intended for minority business
firms. Donovan's firm, the Schiavone Construction Co., has been accused of using a ficticious
minority business, "Jopel Contracting and Trucking," as a sham for inflated billings. The
Schiavone Company has denied any knowledge of such actions. The company has, however,
acknowledged that Schiavone retained $7.4 million of the $12.4 million actually charged by
Jopel, telling the Transit Authority that the entire "$12.4 million had been paid to the minor-
ity business." Lardner, Donovan Lawyers Lash Prosecution, Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1986, at A6,
col. 1.
11. Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 16.
12. Id. at 18. The applicable New Jersey statute reads: "Every action at law for libel or
slander shall be commenced within 1 year next after the publication of the alleged libel or
slander." N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-3 (West 1952).
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for purposes of
determining the actual date of publication, a substantial distribution of the issue took place on
May 19, 1982. Since the New Jersey statute of limitations for libel is one year, commencing on
the date of publication, the statutory period expired in this case on May 19, 1983. Schiavone,
750 F.2d at 16.
13. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2381.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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merely "Fortune."' 16 These amended complaints were served by certified
mail on Time's agent on July 21, 1983.
The district court granted Time's motion to dismiss the amended com-
plaints, holding that the New Jersey statute of limitations barred the ac-
tions."7 The court concluded that because Time had not received notice of
the action within the statutory time limits, the amendments to the initial
complaints did not relate back to the date of the original filing.' 8
Characterizing the language of rule 15(c) as "clear and unequivocal," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling.' 9 The Third Circuit held that the applicable period within
which a party to be added "must receive notice under rule 15(c) does not
include the time available for service of process. ,20
The Supreme Court affirmed in a divided opinion and held that the July
1983 amendments to the complaints did not relate back to the original filing
date.2 ' Writing for the majority,22 Justice Blackmun maintained that notice
to Time did not occur " 'within the period provided by law for commencing
the action against' " Time as required by rule 15(c) since such notice oc-
curred after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations.2 3 In his
16. Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 17. An issue contested in the lower court and examined by the
Supreme Court dissenters in Schiavone concerned the affect this alteration in plaintiff's com-
plaint had upon the litigation. Justice Stevens, contrary to the majority opinion, viewed the
addition as tantamount to merely the correction of a misnomer. See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at
2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
On balance, the view that the amendment in Schiavone, from "Fortune" to "Fortune also
known as Time, Incorporated" was merely the correction of a misnomer appears the more
tenable.
17. Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 17. The United States Supreme Court decision in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) held that "[e]xcept as to matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the federal courts, in diversity cases, must apply state law
rather than federal law in determining substantive issues." Thus, in this case the New Jersey
statute of limitations was applied.
18. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2382.
19. Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 18-19.
20. Id. at 18. Plaintiffs contested this interpretation, arguing that rule 15(c) was instituted
and amended "to ameliorate literal and rigid application of limitations periods to both claim
and party amendments." Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2383. They further contended that the
legislative purpose of the rule was to "allow[ ] relation back of a change in the name or identity
of a defendant when, although the statutory period for filing had run, the period allowed by
Rule 4 for timely service had not .. " Id. at 2382-83.
21. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2384-86.
22. Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Rehn-
quist, and O'Connor. Id. at 2380.
23. Id. at 2385. Relying predominantly on the Advisory Committee's Note to the pro-
posed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice Blackmun opined that " 'within the period
provided by law for commencing the action' means 'within the applicable limitations period.'
Id. Citing the applicable provisions, he maintained that:
[Vol. 36:499
Relation Back Doctrine
view, rule 15(c) as amended is clearly drafted, and any construction contrary
to this unequivocal language would constitute an impermissible rewriting of
the rule.
24
Finding the majority decision unsupported by the purposes of rule 15(c),
Justice Stevens dissented for four reasons. First, he pointed out that under
rule 4(j), service of the summons and complaint may be made within 120
days of the original filing. 25 Thus, while an action may be timely filed, even
an accurately named defendant may not receive notice until after the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations.26 Second, there was no evidence that Time
was prejudiced by the amendment. 27 Third, he did not find that the amend-
ment of the plaintiffs' complaint was one "changing a party" against whom
petitioner's claim was asserted. 28  Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the
"liberalizing purpose" of rule 15(c) 29 is circumvented if a construction of the
rule effectively limits the number of allowable relation back cases.3 °
This Note will evaluate the Supreme Court's holding in Schiavone in light
of the purposes for which rule 15(c) was promulgated and the policy consid-
erations underlying statutes of limitations. Further analysis will reveal the
subsequent effects of the ruling upon the doctrine of "relation back." Fi-
nally, this Note will uncover possible flaws in the majority's analysis, but
will nevertheless conclude that the decision is a judicially economic clarifica-
tion of an imprecisely written rule.
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if
the amendment satisfies the usual condition of Rule 15(c) of "arising out of the con-
duct ... set forth ... in the original pleading," and if, within the applicable limita-
tions period, the party brought in by amendment, first, received such notice that ...
he would not be prejudiced in defending the action ....
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note, 39 F.R.D.
69, 83 (1966) (proposed preliminary draft)).
24. See generally Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385.
25. Id. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 2388 n.4.
27. Id. at 2387.
28. Id. at 2388. The four part test articulated in rule 15(c) and interpreted by the majority
is not applied unless the amendment is one " 'changing the party' against whom a claim is
asserted." Id.
Justice Stevens contended that the correction by petitioners did not change the understand-
ing of" 'the party' against whom" the claims were asserted. Id. Time's agent forwarded the
original summons and complaint to Time's legal department noting that the misnomer was a
mere "[d]iscrepancy in corporate title." Id. at 2387. It is clear that Time knew that it was the
intended defendant. Id.
29. Id. at 2389. According to the dissenters, this "liberalizing purpose" is to allow a
plaintiff to amend a pleading error subsequent to the tolling of the statute of limitations if the
correction will not prejudice the defendant. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
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I. THE ADOPTION OF RULE 15(c)
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in par-
ticular rule 15(c), the prevailing test among the federal courts regarding
amendment of pleadings was the "cause of action" concept. 3' Under this
test, an amendment would not relate back and therefore would be barred by
the statute of limitations if, in an amended pleading, a plaintiff attempted to
assert an entirely new legal theory as the basis of his claim. 32 Likewise, if the
amendment stated a "new cause of action," or one different from that in the
original pleading, the new pleading would not survive the statutory bar
under the relation back doctrine.33 For example, an amendment attempting
to add or substitute a new claim would constitute the assertion of a new
cause of action and would not be allowed.34 Conversely, if the amendment
merely altered the form of the cause of action,35 added additional grounds
for relief,36 or changed the jurisdictional bases of action, 37 relation back
would be permitted, provided the factual circumstances alleged remained
unaltered.38 The federal rules, however, broadened the meaning of the
"cause of action" precept by deemphasizing the theory of law and focusing
instead on the defendant's specific conduct upon which the plaintiff based his
claim.39
31. See generally Annotation, Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run, 8
A.L.R.2d 6 (1949). At common law, a plaintiff failing to join a party as defendant or plaintiff
could not amend his pleading to correct the error. Id. at 11. He was required to drop the suit
and reinstitute the action. Id. Gradually, however, this burdensome practice was abandoned
for a more liberal view allowing amendments which would not deprive the opposing party of
any rights. Id. Amendments were generally allowed, provided the real parties in interest and
the cause of action remained the same. Id.
32. See 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.15[3], at 15-151 (2d ed. 1985);
see also Bowles v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 5 F.R.D. 230, 233 (D. Minn. 1946) (rule permitting a new
cause of action in an amendment after the tolling of a statute of limitations would be beyond
the power of the court).
33. See Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c): Relation Back of Amendments, 57
MINN. L. REV. 83, 85 (1972).
34. See Griggs v. Farmer, 430 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1970) (no relation back where "entirely
new claim" asserted).
35. See Note, supra note 33, at 85.
36. 3 J. MOORE, supra note 32, at 15-151.
37. Id. at 15-154.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 15-151; see Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18 F.R.D. 169, 175 (M.D. Pa. 1955)
(assertion of new legal theory is not new cause of action). Prior to the 1966 amendment of rule
15(c), the rule consisted of only the first sentence of the modern subdivision. It read
"[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." See 3 J. MOORE, supra note 32,
15.15[4.-1], at 15-156.
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Accordingly, a new test-the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence
test-replaced the former cause of action standard. Using this revised stan-
dard as a guide, federal courts began examining the facts of each relation
back case and balancing the propriety of permitting the amendment against
the policy considerations supporting statutes of limitations.4" Some factors
the courts considered in determining the relation back status of an amend-
ment are the relationship between parties41 and whether the party to be ad-
ded had received adequate notice of the pending suit.42 Generally, absent
prejudice, bad faith, or undue delay, amendment of a pleading has been
allowed.43
While rule 15 as a whole governs the general criteria and procedures for
the amendment of pleadings, subsection (c) relates specifically to the opera-
tion of the rule in cases where a party seeks to amend a pleading after the
tolling of the statute of limitations. In this context, it is apparent that the
operation of rule 15(c) is in direct conflict with the policies underlying stat-
utes of limitations since, in certain circumstances, it allows a party to avoid
compliance with the statute.
The primary purpose of the statute of limitations defense is to compel the
filing of a suit within a reasonable time period so that a defendant will have a
fair opportunity to prepare his defense.44 If a clear and unambiguous dead-
line before which a plaintiff must institute an action were lacking, severe
40. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 323 U.S. 574, 581 (1945) ("There is no reason
to apply a statute of limitations when, as here, the respondent has had notice from the begin-
ning .... "); see also 3 J. MOORE, supra note 32, at 15.15[4.-2], at 15-161 to -163.
41. See, e.g., Milner v. National School of Health Technology, 73 F.R.D. 628 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (Where employer changed from a proprietorship to a corporation after plaintiff's dis-
charge, and plaintiff contended an identity of interest existed between the corporation and
proprietorship, she was entitled to discovery as to whether such relationship existed.).
42. Goodrich v. England, 262 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1958). In cases involving the
change in description of parties, two tests are used. First, what entity did the plaintiff intend to
sue? And second, was the defendant notified of the pending action and adequately served with
process? Id.
43. See Note, supra note 33, at 87. As one court maintained:
The test should be whether, on the basis of an objective standard, it is reasonable to
conclude that the plaintiff had in mind a particular entity or person, merely made a
mistake as to the name, and actually served the entity or person intended; or whether
plaintiff actually meant to serve and sue a different person.
Grandey v. Pacific Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1954) (quoting 2 J. MOORE, MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.44, at 1042 (2d ed. 1948).
44. Note, supra note 33, at 84; see Housing Auth. v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 25 N.J.
330, 335, 136 A.2d 401, 403 (1957) (statutes of limitations are "practical and pragmatic de-
vices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his
defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been
lost").
1987]
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prejudice to the defendant could result.4 5 Information essential to a mean-
ingful defense to a plaintiff's allegations may become increasingly unavaila-
ble as time elapses between the incident precipitating the cause of action and
the filing of the complaint.4 6 Witnesses that may be indispensable to the
defendant's case may die or move beyond the jurisdiction of the court.4 7
Moreover, even if witnesses are available, their recollection of the events giv-
ing rise to the suit may become distorted over time.4 8
Several other policies are served by statutes of limitations. The most sig-
nificant of these is judicial economy.49 In the absence of statutory mandates
limiting the time for initiating causes of action, courts would bear the burden
of ascertaining antiquated factual issues causing potentially ruinous expendi-
tures of court time and resources. In their efforts to promote judicial econ-
omy courts might be inclined to shorten the statutory period to a minimum,
thereby limiting the vast number of claims requiring adjudication. Never-
theless, limitations periods are statutorily, not judicially, prescribed. Ac-
cordingly, the time period in a statute of limitations is actually an arbitrary
period determined by a state legislature and not by the judicial process."0
II. THE 1966 AMENDMENT-COMPONENTS OF THE RELATION BACK
TEST
Typically, the instances in which the relation back issue arose under the
preamendment federal rules occurred in certain actions by private parties
against officers or agencies of the United States.5' In these cases, claimants
45. See generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions §§ 17, 18 (1970); see also Fore-
most Properties, Inc. v. Gladman, 100 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Roth v. Northern
Assurance Co., 32 I11. 2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 415 (1964); Merritt v. Cravens, 168 Ky. 155, 181
S.W. 970 (1916); Anaconda Mining Co. v. Saile, 16 Mont, 8, 39 P. 909 (1895); In re Zehner,
124 Neb. 426, 246 N.W. 863 (1933); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 244 A.D.
606, 280 N.Y.S. 836 (1935); Pine v. State Indus. Comm'n, 148 Okla. 200, 298 P. 276 (1931);
Ford v. Schall, 110 Or. 21, 221 P. 1052 (1924); Bowe v. Ledworowsky, 215 Wis. 1, 253 N.W.
791 (1934).
46. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 17.
47. Id.; Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Pearson v. Northeast Air-
lines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
48. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 17.
49. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.9, at 173-77 (1965). Statutes of limitation also serve
significant public policy interests such as stimulating activity, punishing negligence, and pro-
viding consistency. Id.
50. Chase, 325 U.S. at 314.
[Statutes of limitation] are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not dis-
criminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable and unavoidable
delay. They have come into the law not through the judicial process but through
legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate.
Id.
51. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note, 39 FR.D. at 82; see also
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commenced their suits within the statute of limitations period, but incor-
rectly named the government defendant. Upon discovering their mistake,
the claimants moved to amend their complaints after the statutory time pe-
riod had expired. The courts routinely denied these motions and used the
pre-1966 rule 15(c) to view the claimants' amendments as the commence-
ment of new actions, therefore not according them relation back status.52
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules disagreed. The Commit-
tee recognized that in these cases the government had received adequate no-
tice of the action within the statutory period and that the policies of the
statute of limitations, therefore, would not have been offended by allowing
relation back.53 Furthermore, the Committee maintained that since such
amendments did not constitute entirely new actions it would be unjust to
deny the claimant his opportunity for litigation.54 Courts were also faced
with the problem of relation back of amendments that changed defendants in
actions involving private parties. 5 Accordingly, the Advisory Committee
amended rule 15(c) to clarify whether relation back would be allowed where
a party sought to change a defendant or correct a misnomer by amending
the complaint.56
The amended rule reveals that four requirements must be met before rela-
Cohn v. Federal See. Admin. 199 F. Supp. 884 (W.D.N.Y. 1961); Hall v. HEW, 199 F. Supp.
833 (S.D. Tex. 1960); Sandridge v. Folsom, 200 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Tenn. 1959); Cunningham
v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
52. See cases cited supra note 51.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note, 39 F.R.D. at 83.
54. Id. ("[C]haracterization of the amendment as a new proceeding is not responsive to
the reality, but is merely question-begging; and to deny relation back is to defeat unjustly the
claimant's opportunity to prove his case.").
55. Id. One of the most frequently used tests for determining the identity of causes of
action was articulated in Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co., 94 Tex. 456, 61 S.W. 707
(1901): "(1) Would a recovery had upon the original bar a recovery under the amended peti-
tion? (2) Would the same evidence support both of the pleadings? (3) Is the measure of dam-
ages the same in each case? (4) Are the allegations of each subject to the same defenses?" Id.
at 462, 61 S.W. at 709.
But cf James v. Dr. P. Phillips Co., 115 Fla. 472, 155 So. 661 (1934) ("the proper test is
whether the real parties and interests and the essential elements of the controversy remain the
same"). Still other courts maintained that the test should be based upon the identity of the
legal relationship between the parties. McCornack v. Pickrell, 229 Iowa 457, 294 N.W. 746
(1940) ("new and independent cause of action only sustained by showing the same legal rela-
tionship between the parties"). A final alternative test was articulated in Bowles v. Tankar
Gas, Inc., 5 F.R.D. 230, 234 (D. Minn. 1946). "[T]he general wrong suffered and the general
conduct causing the wrong were the controlling considerations in determining whether an
amendment alleged a new cause of action barred by the statute of limitations." Id. See Gran-
dey v. Pacific Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1954) (test is whether plaintiff actually
meant to sue different entity).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note, 39 F.R.D. at 82. The committee
determined to "state more clearly when an amendment of a pleading changing the party
19871
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tion back will be allowed: (1) the claim must have arisen out of the conduct
alleged in the original pleading; (2) the party to be added must have received
such notice that he will not be prejudiced; (3) the party must know or should
know that but for a mistake of identity, the action would have been brought
against him; and (4) requirements two and three must have been fulfilled
within the period provided by law for the commencement of the action
against the defendant." The conflicts in interpretation of the rule have
arisen primarily in the context of the last three provisions because the first
requirement merely incorporated the operation of rule 15(c) prior to its 1966
amendment.
A. The Prejudice Requirement
Rule 15(c) stipulates that the party to be added by amendment receive
such notice that no prejudice will result in presenting his defense on the
merits.5 8 Unfortunately, few guidelines have emerged which effectively de-
fine "prejudice" in the context of rule 15(c). 59 Courts generally have
reached conclusions concerning the prejudice requirement without adequate
factual analysis.6°
One of the few attempts to distinguish and address the prejudice issue
occurred in Craig v. United States.6 1 In Craig, a timely action was brought
by a plaintiff whose husband was killed attempting to land a military plane.
Subsequent to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff sought
to add a corporation as a defendant. The court held that the prejudice re-
against whom a claim is asserted (including an amendment to correct a misnomer or misde-
scription of a defendant) shall 'relate back' to the date of the original pleading." Id.
57. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2384. But see id. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The major-
ity in Schiavone stated this fourth requirement as: "(4) the second and third requirements
must have been fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period." Id. at 2384. This reading of
requirement (4) is nowhere explicitly stated in the rule itself. Rather, it represents the major-
ity's interpretation of the language of rule 15(c). This language was viewed as so "clear and
unequivocal" that the Court saw fit to incorporate this interpretation into the articulated four-
part test. Id. at 2382. Justice Stevens, however, did not agree that the language was as clear as
contended and did not endorse the majority's rendition of rule 15(c). Id. at 2388-89.
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
59. See Note, supra note 33, at 115.
60. Id. "The approach of most courts to the prejudice requirement has been to state
rather bare conclusions without factual analysis." Id. Two reasons were posited for the lack
of in-depth analysis of the prejudice requirement. First, the author surmised "that the preju-
dice requirement is not regarded as an independent criterion," but merely a restatement of the
other three. Id. Second, it was reasoned that many decisions allowing relation back have been
based upon the identity of interest exception (to be discussed infra) which presumed that no
prejudice would result if the proposed defendant was closely related to the named defendant.
Id. at 115-16.
61. 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969).
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quirement was not satisfied even though the corporation had investigated the
relevant facts of a pending suit by another plaintiff injured in the same acci-
dent because it had not necessarily investigated all the facts relevant to the
later suit involving the decedent.62 This decision reveals at least one element
of the prejudice requirement. That is, defendant must be aware of more than
just the incident giving rise to a lawsuit; he also must know specific facts of
the suit to which he is to be added.63 A second court found, similarly, that a
proposed defendant would be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the
merits by the passage of an extended period of time between the events giv-
ing rise to the cause of action and notice of suit. 6'
From cases specifically discussing prejudice in a 15(c) context,6" it follows
that the focus of the prejudice requirement is upon the proposed defendant's
ability to obtain sufficient evidence that he may properly prepare his case to
defend against the plaintiff's allegations.66 To illustrate, in Bryant Electric
Co. v. Joe Rainero Tile Co., 67 relation back was allowed where the defendant
could not show any prejudice regarding the presentation or preparation of
his defense.68 The presentation and preparation of a defense necessarily in-
volves obtaining facts and evidence. Thus, the major value served by the
prejudice requirement is the assurance that, should the amendment be al-
62. Craig, 413 F.2d at 858. But cf Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal.
1966) (defendant was not found to be prejudiced after he had conducted a complete investiga-
tion of the facts).
63. Craig, 413 F.2d at 858. Wright and Miller have proffered a different approach:
"[T]he court should not give special treatment to the careless or myopic defendant whose
alleged prejudice results from his own superficial investigatory practices or his poor prepara-
tion of a defense." 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1498, at 510.
64. Burns v. Turner Constr. Co., 265 F. Supp. 768, 770 (D. Mass. 1967) (Prejudice would
result since the passage of nearly four years had obscured both accident site conditions and
witnesses' memories.).
65. See id.; Craig, 413 F.2d at 858 (defendant found prejudiced where no knowledge of
facts relating to case at bar); In re Osage Exploration Co., 104 F.R.D. 45, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(type of prejudice invalidating an amendment is usually that which unfairly disadvantages a
defendant); Bryant Elec. Co. v. Joe Rainero Tile Co., 84 F.R.D. 120, 123 (W.D. Va. 1979) (no
prejudice found where defendant knew or should have known of initial complaint); Nevels v.
Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251, 257 (5th Cir. 1971) (one factor considered in prejudice require-
ment is that of last minute surprise).
66. See Note, supra note 33, at 115. "[T]he phrase ['prejudice in maintaining his defense
on the merits'] properly should be construed to mean that the proposed defendant will be
deprived of the fair opportunity to obtain evidence before it becomes stale." Id.
This "stale evidence" analysis has been employed by a number of courts. See Chase Sec.
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); see also Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d
553, 559 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963). Still, an additional purpose inherent
in the statute of limitations is the protection of the potential defendants from "protracted fear
of litigation." 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 17 (1970).
67. 84 F.R.D. 120 (W.D. Va. 1979).
68. Bryant, 84 F.R.D. at 124.
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lowed, the proposed defendant would not be prevented from obtaining ade-
quate information and evidence regarding the pending suit.6 9
B. The Knowledge Requirement
In addition to receiving such notice to avoid prejudice, a proposed defend-
ant must also know or be expected to know that, but for a mistake concern-
ing identity, the particular action would have been instituted against him.
70
Again, as with the prejudice requirement, courts have neglected to define
distinctly when this knowledge requirement has been satisfied. The require-
ment is unquestionably fulfilled when, for example, a newly named defend-
ant is served with process that merely misnames him.7t Relation back has
also been allowed where a plaintiff mistakenly names the wrong party but
correctly serves the intended defendant.72
The vagueness with respect to the knowledge criterion concerns the ques-
tion of when a defendant "should have known" that a suit was pending
69. See Taliferro v. Costello, 467 F. Supp. 33, 35 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Evidence of prejudice
requires showing that defendant "has been hindered in its ability to obtain relevant evidence
needed to mount its defense.") (emphasis added).
70. See FED. R. Cv. P. 15(c).
71. Note, supra note 33, at 118 n.123. In the following cases, the proposed defendant had
knowledge of a misnomer, and the amendment was allowed to relate back: Wynne v. United
States ex ret. Mid-States Waterproofing Co., 382 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1967); Brittian v. Belk
Gallant Co., 301 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Ga. 1969); McDonald v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 27
F.R.D. 442 (W.D. Pa. 1961); Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1950);
Godfrey v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Assocs., 71 F. Supp. 175 (D. Mass. 1947).
In this context, it would be difficult for the defendant to convince any court that the allega-
tions in the complaint were totally foreign. The factual context giving rise to the action as
articulated in the complaint will undoubtedly be somewhat familiar to the defendant; familiar
enough, therefore, to impute the requisite knowledge of the impending suit. A misnomer of
the defendant would thus be insufficient to allow him to escape defending against the suit.
This situation, as Justice Stevens indicated, remarkably parallels the facts of Schiavone. The
newly named defendant, "Fortune also known as Time, Inc.," was merely misdescribed as
"Fortune." Justice Stevens did not construe the amendment as bringing in Time as a defend-
ant. Moreover, "the difference between the description of the publisher of Fortune in the
original complaints and the description of the publisher of Fortune in the amended complaints
is no more significant than a misspelling . Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
72. See Marino v. Gotham Chalkboard Mfg. Corp., 259 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
See also Infotronics Corp. v. Varian Assocs., 45 F.R.D. 91 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (where the wrong
defendant was originally served but the complaint was forwarded to the proper defendant).
As in the situation described in note 71, supra, where a defendant receives a copy of the
summons and complaint accurately describing a factual situation with which he is familiar but
errantly bearing the name of a completely different individual, the intended defendant again
may find it difficult to argue that he does not have knowledge of the suit. The rule itself seems
to address this very problem by providing that but for a mistake in identity, the defendant was
so familiar with the factual context that he would not be surprised to be later named as the
true party sued. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
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against him. Courts have only provided cursory answers regarding this is-
sue. 73 In Dutka v. Southern Railroad Co.,74 the new defendant railroad was
told it "should have known" that it would have been named as a defendant
since it owned the train and employed the crew that was involved in the
incident giving rise to the action. 75 Similarly, in Taliferro v. Costello76 the
court allowed relation back of an amended complaint naming the city of
Philadelphia as a defendant in a civil rights action since service was properly
made on the city's deputy sheriff.77 The court determined that the city
"should have known" that its joinder was possible.7' This "distinct possibil-
ity of joinder" standard was bolstered by the further recognition that it was
unlikely that the city of Philadelphia was surprised by the amendment. 79
Courts denying relation back based upon the knowledge requirement have
applied somewhat different criteria in their analyses. In Hernandez Jiminez
v. Calero Toledo,"° a city employee alleged that he was wrongfully dis-
charged for political reasons. After initially charging his supervisor and re-
viewing commission members, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint after
the expiration of the limitations period to name the city's mayor and a local
political party leader.8 ' The court held that the proposed defendants could
not have been expected to know of their potential joinder since it was possi-
ble that they were not named as parties to the original complaint for tactical
reasons or because of a lack of evidence when the complaint was filed.8 2
73. When a plaintiff names an incorrect party, it is likely that courts use a reasonable man
test to determine whether a party "should have known" he was the intended defendant. C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1498, at 515 (Supp. 1986); see Swann Oil Inc. v. M/S
Vassilis, 91 F.R.D. 267, 269 (E.D.N.C. 1981); King & King Enter. v. Champlin Petroleum
Co., 446 F. Supp. 906, 910 (E.D. Okla. 1978); Romero v. Ole Tires Inc., 101 N.M. 759, 688
P.2d 1263, 1267 (Ct. App. 1984).
74. 92 F.R.D. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
75. Id. at 378.
76. 467 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
77. Taliferro, 467 F. Supp. at 34. The amendment was attempted after the tolling of the
statute of limitations.
78. Id. at 36 (citing Williams v. Avis Transp., 57 F.R.D. 53 (D. Nev. 1972)). In Williams,
plaintiff's original complaint only named as a defendant the company from which plaintiff had
rented an automobile. An amendment to join the tire manufacturer was held to relate back
since, within the limitations period, plaintiff's counsel had notified the manufacturer of the
action against the rental company and of plaintiff's belief that the car's tires were defective. 57
F.R.D. at 55 n.4.
79. Taliferro, 467 F. Supp. at 35.
80. 604 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1979).
81. Id. at 100; see Larry v. Penn Truck Aids, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(amended complaint naming the international union as defendant would not relate back where
affidavit of administrative assistant established that the union neither knew nor had reason to
know of institution of action prior to service of amended complaint).
82. Hernandez, 604 F.2d at 103. Contrary to the standard used in Taliferro that relation
back is allowed where a proposed defendant knows that his joinder is possible, the Hernandez
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The final component of the knowledge requirement is that rule 15(c) pro-
vides not only that the proposed defendant knew or should have known of a
pending action, but also that, absent a mistake concerning the identity of the
proper party, the defendant knew the action would have been brought
against him. 3 This additional requirement has been interpreted to imply
that (1) a mistake concerning identity must have occurred and (2) the pro-
posed defendant knew or at least had reason to know of the mistake.8 4 In
some instances, the mistake may be excused regardless of whether the de-
fendant had the requisite knowledge. The inexcusability of the mistake,
however, is not determinative of whether rule 15(c) is to be applied. Rather,
it has been held that inexcusable error is merely a factor to be considered in
determining whether prejudice to the defendant would result should relation
back be allowed. 5
For example, in Jacobs v. McClosky, 6 the district court noted that plain-
tiff bears the burden of finding the proper defendant. Thus, a plaintiff can
neither complain about dismissal nor amend a pleading where failure to
name the proper party was due to his own error and not caused by the de-
fendant.8 7 The Jacobs court referred to the time of plaintiff's filing and
stated that it was plaintiff's decision to file so close to the limitations dead-
court seemed to invoke an opposite test. In Hernandez, the court disallowed relation back
because the proposed defendant knew that it was possible for him not to be joined as a defend-
ant. Id. Nevertheless, even though differing results were reached and a different test used,
each court probably made an accurate assessment of whether allowing relation back would
prejudice the defendant based on the facts of each case.
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
84. See Slack v. Treadway Inn, 388 F. Supp. 15 (M.D. Pa. 1974); see also Brown v.
International Union, 85 F.R.D. 328 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Chaldek v. Sterns Transp. Co., 427 F.
Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (no relation back where plaintiff did not allege mistake concerning
proper party); Francis v. Pan Am. Trinidad Oil Co., 392 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Del. 1975); Wil-
liams v. Dana Corp. 54 F.R.D. 473 (E.D. Mich. 1971). In Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41
F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966), the Court stated "Lockheed should have known at an early mo-
ment that there was a strong possibility of a mistake of identity on the part of Plaintiff and her
counsel." Id. at 38.
85. Bruce v. Smith, 581 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Va. 1984).
86. 40 F.R.D. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1966). In Jacobs, plaintiff filed suit against the First Penn-
sylvania Banking and Trust Co., alleging negligence and personal injury. This complaint, filed
nine days prior to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations, alleged that the named
defendant owned the building which was involved in the dispute. In actuality, however, it was
owned by First Penco Realty, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the First Pennsylvania Co.
As a result of an error by defendant's insurance carrier, both corporations were led to believe
that ownership was vested in the First Pennsylvania Co. Upon discovering the error, First
Pennsylvania moved, and was allowed, to amend its answer to deny an originally admitted
allegation of ownership. Plaintiff's amended complaint, however, was denied relation back
status.
87. See Bruce, 581 F. Supp. at 906.
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line, a decision unaffected by any action of the defendant.88 Other courts,
utilizing an inexcusable neglect analysis,8 9 have employed criteria such as
conscious delay, failure to diligently pursue the action, and failure to dili-
gently research the proper defendant to determine when an amendment will
be barred.
The courts interpreting the prejudice and knowledge requirements have
not reached the fourth element of the relation back test.90 This element in-
volves ascertaining whether the defendant was given sufficient notice to over-
come any prejudice and had the necessary knowledge of the suit within the
period prescribed by the statute of limitations. Because this part of the rela-
tion back test has engendered great debate among the circuit courts of ap-
peals, the issues surrounding it will be examined in the following section that
focuses upon the various approaches adopted by those courts in applying
rule 15(c).
III. CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
The Supreme Court in Schiavone granted the petition for certiorari to re-
solve an apparent conflict among the circuits regarding application of the
relation back doctrine. The dispute focused on four issues: (1) the precise
meaning of "changing" a party; (2) the application of an identity of interest
exception; (3) the degree of formality of notice required; and (4) the meaning
of the rule's "within the period provided by law" language. Although all of
these issues were not presented by Schiavone, each will be discussed to pro-
vide an essential analytical framework for an understanding of the relation
back rule.
A. Changing a Party
The second sentence of rule 15(c) applies only when the amendment is one
"changing the party against whom a claim is asserted."'" The precise mean-
88. Jacobs, 40 F.R.D. at 488.
89. See, e.g., Marchant v. City of Little Rock, 741 F.2d 201, 205 (8th Cir. 1984) (no
attempt to add defendant after trial had begun); Nayer v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co.,
195 F. Supp. 704, 706 (D. Mass. 1961) (amendment after statute tolled was discretionary);
McDonald v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 27 F.R.D. 442, 443 (W.D. Pa. 1961) (neglect excused
where counsel unaware of answer to complaint); Hess v. Carmine, 396 A.2d 173, 177 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1978) (neglect excused where failure to amend was due to mistaken belief that
statute tolled based upon clerical error).
90. Moreover, discussing this remaining issue separately is also warranted by the fact that
those courts interpreting the prejudice and knowledge requirements did not reach the timeli-
ness issue. See Dutka v. Southern Ry., 92 F.R.D. 375, 377 (N.D. Ga. 1981); see also Taliferro
v. Costello, 467 F. Supp. 33, 33 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
91. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1498, at 511.
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ing of "changing," however, has been subject to varying interpretations as to
whether relation back should be allowed where, for instance, an amendment
seeks to "add" a new party rather than "change" a party.9 2
In King v. Udall,9" the court viewed rule 15(c) as limited to amendments
changing a party defendant. It did not apply the rule to additional parties.
9 4
In contrast, the court in Meredith v. United Air Lines95 asserted that the
"changing" concept necessarily embodies the naming of a new party.9 6
Though the two viewpoints are unquestionably at odds, the latter, less re-
strictive interpretation is preferred. 97 The former view, in apparent contra-
vention of the intent of the Advisory Committee, would not apply rule 15(c)
unless a defendant has been misnamed or misdescribed. a s The Advisory
Committee directly addressed this problem, stating that the purpose of the
1966 amendment was to clarify the operation of relation back where the
defendant had been changed or misdescribed. 99 Prior to the 1966 amend-
92. See Taliferro, 467 F. Supp. at 34. The pertinent portion of rule 15(c) about which the
dispute rages provides: "An amendment changing a party against whom a claim is asserted
relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied. ... FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (emphasis
added).
93. 266 F. Supp. 747 (D.D .C. 1967).
94. Id. at 749.
95. 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
96. Id. at 39. According to one commentator, the phrase "changing a party" may con-
note as many as four different meanings: "(1) substitution of a new defendant for the present
defendant, (2) addition of a defendant, (3) changing the stated capacity of the defendant, and
(4) changing a misdescription or misnaming (misnomer) of the defendant." Note, supra note
33, at 106.
Regardless of the possible interpretations, one fact remains clear. No interpretation should
be given to the phrase that fails to promote the values implicit in the statute of limitations
concept because it was with these values in mind that the relation back doctrine was forged.
97. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1498, at 260 ("changing" should be
liberally construed).
98. Taliferro, 467 F. Supp. at 34. Such a restrictive view emerges as merely a game of
legal and statutory semantics and totally ignores the recognized liberalizing purpose of the
1966 amendment to rule 15(c).
Furthermore, Professor Benjamin Kaplan, now Justice Kaplan of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court and former reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules,
prophetically commented that:
I am a little discouraged to find a hint in decisions interpreting the revised rule-
opposed by indications in others-that the phrase "changing the party against whom
a claim is asserted" must be read as inevitably confined to cases where incorrect
defendant A is eliminated and correct defendant B is brought in instead ....
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee. 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 410 (1967).
99. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. at 82. Some courts have held that mere mis-
nomers need not meet the "changing a party" requirement of amended rule 15(c). See, e.g.,
Washington v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849, 856 (W.D. La. 1971); Wentz v. Alberto
Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327, 1328-29 (D. Mont. 1969); see also 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 3, § 1498, at 513-14. However, the history of the 1966 amendment as well as prece-
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ment the court in Travelers Insurance Company v. Brown "o adopted an even
broader view than that of Meredith in recognizing the permissive nature of
rule 15(c) and maintaining that new defendants and new theories of recovery
would be allowed. 101
B. The Identity of Interest Exception
One exception to the disallowance of relation back of amendments chang-
ing parties subsequent to the expiration of the statute of limitations involves
the relationship between the proposed and named defendants. Those juris-
dictions recognizing this exception maintain that where the parties are inti-
mately associated in their business operations or other activities, institution
of an action against one serves as the requisite notice to the other. 102 Thus,
when the parties have such an identity of interest, an amendment adding the
intended party will relate back assuming satisfaction of the remaining re-
quirements of rule 15(c). 10 3 For example, the court in Dutka 1" allowed an
dent indicate otherwise. Most courts have assumed that the second sentence of rule 15(c)
applies equally to misnomer amendments. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. United States, 382
F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir. 1967); see also Horwitt v. Longines Wittnauer Watch Co., 388 F.
Supp. 1257, 1258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mitchell v. Hendricks, 68 F.R.D. 564, 566 (E.D. Pa.
1975). Similarly, the court in Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978), concluded that
"an amendment merely correcting a 'misnomer' is nonetheless one 'changing the party against
whom a claim is asserted.' " Id. at 570. See Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir.
1973) (when a person or entity is changed, a substitution rather than a correction has oc-
curred); see also Stewart v. United States, 655 F.2d 741, 742 (7th Cir. 1981).
100. 338 F.2d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 1964).
101. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1498, at 513-14 ("when plaintiff seeks
to correct the name or description of a defendant the amendment will relate back provided the
proper defendant was served and the party before the court is the one plaintiff intended to
sue").
See also Gabriel v. Kent Gen. Hosp. Inc., 95 F.R.D. 391, 394 (D. Del. 1982) (relation back
allowed where new party is substituted or added as well as when intended defendant has been
misnamed or misdescribed); but see Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp.
399, 405 (W.D. La. 1970) (relation back not allowed where no misnomer or misdescription of
defendants, but where plaintiff attempted to name entirely different party as defendant).
Wright and Miller further cite Brittian v. Belk Gallant Co., 301 F. Supp. 478, 478-79 (D. Ga.
1969) stating that "the proper test is whether the complaint was served upon the proper party
and whether the added party had notice of the suit."
102. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1498, at 516-17.
103. Id. Courts recognizing this identity of interest exception include: Korn v. Royal Car-
ibbean Cruise Line, Inc., 724 F.2d 1397, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984); Kirk v. Kronvich, 629 F.2d 404,
408-09 (5th Cir. 1980); Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 102-03 (1st Cir.
1979); Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135, 1147 (5th Cir. 1970); Travelers Indem.
Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 103, 105-06 (10th Cir. 1967); Donovan v. Gillmor, 535 F. Supp.
154, 160-62 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Swann Oil, Inc. v. M/S Vassilis, 91 F.R.D. 267, 269 (E.D.N.C.
1981); Dutka v. Southern Ry., 92 F.R.D. 375, 378 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Wong v. Calvin, 87
F.R.D. 145, 148 (N.D. Fla. 1980); Sorrels v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 84 F.R.D. 663, 666 (D.
Del. 1979); Holden v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., 82 F.R.D. 157, 161 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
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amendment by a plaintiff passenger who originally named one railroad as a
defendant and sought to join a second railroad that was a subsidiary of the
first. Because the second railroad had received constructive notice of the suit
and should have known that it was, indeed, the intended defendant, the
court permitted the amendment to relate back.105
Other relationships exist that have been held to satisfy the identity of
interest test. In addition to the parent-subsidiary relationship of Dutka, an
identity of interest has also been found between related corporations,
10 6
successor corporations, 10 7 and, in one case, between an insurer and its
insured.'o
Notwithstanding the recognition of relation back in the preceding in-
stances, some courts have utilized a more exacting method of review to con-
clude that no identity of interest exists.' 0 9 In Martz v. Miller Brothers
Co., 11O for example, the district court found no identity of interest and de-
nied relation back where two stores shared virtually the same name, the
same business activities, and overlapping officers and shareholders."' 1 The
Martz plaintiff mistakenly served an agent of the named corporation who
was not an agent of the entity intended as the defendant. The court found
that, despite the commonalities, such service did not constitute institution of
the action against the intended corporation, nor was it adequate notice
within the period required by rule 15(c)." 2
In any event, as one court pointed out just after the amendment of rule
15(c), many courts neglect to clearly define under what circumstances an
104. 92 F.R.D. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
105. Id.
106. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1499, at 518-19. Termed brother-sister
companies, these corporations often share the same officers, directors, or shareholders. Also,
these corporations usually have similar names or conduct their business from the same offices.
See De Coelho v. Seaboard Shipping Corp., 535 F. Supp. 629, 636-37 (D.P.R. 1982).
107. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1499, at 519. Successor corporations
generally constitute past and present forms of the same venture. The problem often arises in a
rule 15(c) context where, unknown to the plaintiff, the ownership of defendant corporation has
changed. See Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 411 n.14 (6th Cir. 1982).
Relation back of an amendment to correct a misnomer has generally been allowed in this
situation where plaintiff's intentions were clearly to sue the existing corporation and the in-
tended defendant received adequate notice.
108. Angel v. Ray, 285 F. Supp. 64, 66 (E.D. Wisc. 1968).
109. See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Acton Corp., 600 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C. 1984).
110. 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1965).
111. Id. at 248. The court concluded that identity of interest "requires that the two stores
be regarded simply as enterprises of the Miller family. The court could then say that an em-
ployee of either store was ultimately beholden to the family .... Finally, on a more concep-
tual level, the corporations exist under Delaware Law as distinct entities .... " Id. at 255.
112. See id.
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identity of interest would exist between new and former parties such that
allowing the addition of the new party would not be prejudicial." 3 This
statement remains true today.
C Formal v. Informal Notice
An additional point of contention directly related to the prejudice require-
ment is whether formal or informal notice to the proposed defendant is nec-
essary before an amendment will be allowed to relate back. The Advisory
Committee's note states that while the party to be brought in by amendment
must receive notice of the institution of the action, the requisite notice need
not be formal.'1 4 Nonetheless, some courts still have questioned the degree
of formality required. It has been held that "notice of the institution of the
action" means notice of the filing of the lawsuit and not merely knowledge of
events giving rise to a cause of action." 5 These cases construe the require-
ment as mandating actual, not constructive notice since it is traditionally
service of process upon the defendant that will convey notice of the filing of
the suit.
In Patterson v. White, 116 however, the court took a notably different ap-
proach. In Patterson, an action was brought against the trustees of a church.
The plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted service upon the trustees and, after
the expiration of the statute of limitations, amended the complaint to name
instead the church itself as corporate defendant. Noting that the notice re-
quirement should be liberally construed," 17 the court allowed the plaintiff to
show that the church or the trustees had received notice through means
other than service. 118
113. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1968).
114. FED. R. Cv. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note, 39 F.R.D. at 83.
115. Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969);
Wentz v. Alberto Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (D. Mont. 1969); see Davis v. Cadwell,
94 F.R.D. 306 (D. Del. 1982) (notice of potential claim not equivalent to notice of institution
of the action required by rule 15(c)), remanded without opinion, 709 F.2d 1491 (3d Cir. 1983).
116. 51 F.R.D. 175 (D.D.C. 1970).
117. Such liberal construction is illustrated in Meredith, which held that a Civil Aeronau-
tics Board inquiry conducted by the proposed defendant aircraft manufacturer coupled with a
written report of the contested incident constituted sufficient notice. Meredith v. United Air
Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34, 38 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
118. This holding necessarily implies that actual notice received through service of process
is not the sole means for a potential defendant to receive adequate notice. The courts allowing
constructive notice as sufficient have recognized that the test of whether the proposed defend-
ant knew or should have known of the action being brought against him should not be rigidly
applied. A defendant need not receive a copy of the summons and complaint in order to know
that he has engaged in some action giving rise to a lawsuit. Moreover, the language parenthe-
tically inserted in the Advisory Committee's Note seems a convincing indicium that the Com-
mittee, too, contemplated this fact. See Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1980)
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D. Within the Period Provided by Law for Commencing the Action
Perhaps the most contested issue among the federal circuits is the 15(c)
mandate that both notice and knowledge requirements be fulfilled "within
the period provided by law for commencing the action against [the proposed
defendant]."" 19 Although much confusion has resulted in the interpretation
of this portion of the rule, the prevailing view seems to be that the "period
provided by law" requires that notice to the defendant must have occurred
within the statute of limitations period. 120
The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have faithfully adhered to this
literal interpretation of the notice requirement. 121 In Hughes v. United
States, 122 the complaint, filed just before the expiration of the applicable stat-
ute of limitations, named the FBI and the United States Department of Jus-
("we do not believe that actual notice is required under Rule 15(c)"); see also Williams v.
United States, 405 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1968) (fair notice is sufficient); Ramirez v. Burr, 607
F. Supp. 170, 173-74 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (actual notice not required; service of original complaint
upon agent of proposed defendant is adequate); Williams v. Ward, 553 F. Supp. 1024, 1026
(W.D.N.Y. 1983) (constructive notice is sufficient provided such notice encourages defendant
to prepare a defense in anticipation of potential action against him); Taliferro v. Costello, 467
F. Supp. 33, 35 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (constructive notice is sufficient); United States v. G.H. Coffey
Co., 100 F.R.D. 413, 416 (D. Me. 1983) (notice may be informal or constructive as well as
actual); Mitchell v. Hendricks, 68 F.R.D. 564, 566 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (informal, as well as formal
notice is sufficient).
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
120. Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. La. 1970); Bren-
nan v. Estate of Smith, 301 F. Supp. 307 (M.D. Pa. 1969). See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory
committee's note, 39 F.R.D. at 83. Several courts have interpreted the Advisory Committee's
Note as specifically stating that "within the period provided by law for commencing the ac-
tion" means "within the applicable limitations period." The Committee Note states:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if
the amendment satisfies the usual condition of Rule 15(c) of "arising out of the con-
duct ... set forth ... in the original pleading," and if, within the applicable limita-
tions period, the party brought in by amendment, first, received . . notice of the
institution of the action ....
39 F.R.D. at 83 (emphasis added).
See also Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1984) (notice to
substitute party must occur within limitations period); Stewart v. United States, 655 F.2d 741,
742 (7th Cir. 1981) (relation back requires that actual notice be received within the limitations
period); accord Hughes v. United States, 701 F.2d 56, 58-59 (7th Cir. 1982) (actual notice must
be received within limitations period).
121. See Watson v. Unipress, Inc. 733 F.2d 1386, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1984); Cooper, 740
F.2d at 716; Stewart, 655 F.2d at 741.
122. 701 F.2d at 56. The case concerned an alleged "sting" operation conducted by de-
fendant, Joseph Meltzer, with the aid of the FBI. Plaintiffs contended that Meltzer misrepre-
sented himself as being president of a fictional company. In reliance on his assurances, as well
as on confirmation by the FBI, plaintiffs entered into a financing agreement to manufacture
and sell cable television equipment and invested $10,000.
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tice as defendants.' 23 After the tolling of the limitations period the plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint naming the United States and others as defend-
ants. The plaintiffs argued that the amended complaint merely corrected a
misnomer in the original complaint (because of the similarity between
"United States" and "United States Department of Justice") and that rule
15(c)'s requirement of notice "within the period provided by law for com-
mencing the action" includes reasonable time allowed for the service of pro-
cess.' 2 4 As to plaintiff's first argument, the court denied the amendment
because a substitution, not merely a correction, occurred when a defendant
was changed. 125 Regarding the second contention, the crux of the disagree-
ment among the circuits, the court denied relation back and required that
actual notice be received by the government within the limitations period. 1
26
In the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, however, a less literal interpreta-
tion of rule 15(c) has emerged. These jurisdictions have refused to read the
rule literally to require notice to the substitute party within the limitations
period.' 27 In Ingram v. Kumar, 128 the most frequently cited case asserting
the liberalized view of rule 15(c), Judge Feinberg allowed relation back even
where notice to the proper defendant was not received until after the tolling
of the statute of limitations.' 29 He recognized that several jurisdictions al-
low the implementation of service of process even after the statute's expira-
tion. Thus, under this view, it is possible that actual notice to a defendant
might not be effected within the limitations period.
123. Id. at 57.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 58 (citing Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1973); Stewart, 655
F.2d at 742.
126. Hughes, 701 F.2d at 58 (citing Stewart, 655 F.2d at 742).
127. See Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 410 (6th Cir. 1982) (allowed
reasonable period for service of process following expiration of statute of limitations).
128. 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978). In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff mistakenly
named a Dr. Vijaya N. Kumar instead of the intended Vijay S. Kumar. Although plaintiff
filed its complaint naming the wrong defendant before the end of the applicable two-year limi-
tations period, the intended defendant knew nothing of the attempted service on the wrong
party and did not himself receive notice until after the limitations period had run.
129. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571. The court maintained that:
Although on its face the phrase "within the period provided by law for commenc-
ing the action against him" seems to mean the applicable statute of limitations pe-
riod, such a literal interpretation is unjustified in jurisdictions where timely service of
process can be effected after the statute of limitations has run. In those jurisdictions,
even an accurately named defendant may not receive actual notice of the action
against him prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Yet, there is no doubt
that the action against him is timely commenced. There is no reason why a mis-
named defendant is entitled to earlier notice than he would have received had the
complaint named him correctly.
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Judge Feinberg reasoned that it would be unjust to force a plaintiff who
has made a mistake in naming a party to give the intended defendant more
timely notice than that the plaintiff could provide to an adequately named
defendant.' 3 ° Moreover, such a literal interpretation of the rule ignores the
mandate of rule 15(a) that amendments shall be freely allowed where justice
would thereby be served.13 ' Accordingly, the court held that the period
within which a proposed defendant must receive notice includes time al-
lowed for service of process.1 32
Early in the history of rule 15(c), the Supreme Court indicated a pro-
nounced reluctance to prevent adjudication based upon mere technical er-
ror. 133 In Conley v. Gibson, 134 the Court announced that the purpose of
pleadings is not to test the practical skill of attorneys, but rather to facilitate
adjudication based upon the merits of the case. 135 In articulating this policy,
the Conley Court communicated the powerful message that, when balancing
the equities of cases, it would be unfair to allow procedural technicalities to
obstruct otherwise meritorious actions. 136
The Court reiterated its position regarding pleadings and technical error
in Fornan v. Davis. 137 This ruling again emphasized that mere technicalities
should not preclude otherwise meritorious actions. 138 Moreover, the federal
rules themselves require that the rules should be construed to ensure that
claims are adjudicated fairly and expeditiously.' 39 The differing interpreta-
tions of rule 15(c) in the lower federal courts despite these pronouncements
prompted the Supreme Court in Schiavone to squarely address the "period
provided by law" issue in hopes of resolving the disagreement.
130. See id.
131. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). Rule 15(c) must, therefore, be analyzed in light of
the other subsections of rule 15. The overriding intent of the entire rule is to sanction the
amendment of pleadings to ensure the proper presentation of the case and to promote the
disposition of the litigation on the merits. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48. Subsection (c) more clearly
defines when an amendment will be allowed in furtherance of the rule's purpose despite the
contrary operation of the statute of limitations.
132. Ingram, 585 F.2d at 572.
133. As the Supreme Court has often reiterated, the federal rules are not to be construed
formalistically. Rather, they should be interpreted with an emphasis upon the merits of the
case. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966); Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957); see also Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 334-35 (1971).
134. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
135. Id. at 48 ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.").
136. See id.
137. 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
138. Id. at 181.
139. Id. at 181-82 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN SCHIAVONE v FORTUNE.-
CLARIFICATION OF RELATION BACK
The plaintiffs in Schiavone instituted libel actions in federal district court
naming "Fortune" magazine as the sole defendant. Service was effected
upon the registered agent of the parent corporation, Time Inc., but the agent
refused process because Time was not specifically named as a party. Hence,
after the tolling of the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs moved to amend
the complaints to name instead "Fortune also known as Time Inc." The
district court rejected the amendment and denied relation back noting that
Time had not received notice of the action within the statutory time limits.
The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the ruling." °
In offering a final resolution of the rule 15(c) "period provided by law"
conflict, the Supreme Court in Schiavone employed what may best be de-
scribed as a plain language interpretation of rule 15(c). Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Blackmun concluded that relation back was prevented by
consideration of the clear language of the rule; Time simply did not receive
the necessary knowledge and notice within the required time."'4 The major-
ity's premise rests on the notion that the "plain language" of rule 15(c) pre-
cludes an interpretation allowing relation back where no notice has been
given within the statutory period. 142
Although the majority sought to deemphasize a liberal-technical distinc-
tion by emphasizing, instead, a plain language analysis, Justice Blackmun
seemingly ignored one significant fact. The interpretation given rule 15(c) in
the decision, although purporting to be neither liberal nor technical, never-
theless has the effect of restricting the prior operation of the rule. Further-
more, the "plain language" of rule 15(c) has been conspicuously subject to
varying constructions. Prior to the decision in Schiavone several federal
jurisdictions interpreted rule 15(c) liberally to include the time for service of
process in the "period provided by law for the commencement of the ac-
tion."' 143 Henceforth, this application of rule 15(c) is effectively curtailed.
Because a technical reading of the rule restricts this liberal interpretation,
technical and liberal readings seem necessarily to be inconsistent. The ma-
140. See supra notes 10-24 and accompanying text.
141. Schiavone v. Fortune a.k.a. Time, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1986). "[N]otice to
Time and the necessary knowledge did not come into being 'within the period provided by law
for commencing the action against' Time, as is so clearly required by Rule 15(c)." Id.
142. See id. "We do not have before us a choice between a 'liberal' approach toward Rule
15(c), on the one hand, and a 'technical' interpretation of the Rule, on the other hand. The
choice, instead, is between recognizing or ignoring what the Rule provides in plain language."
Id.
143. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
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jority, however, did not deny that technical and liberal interpretations are
antipolar; rather it maintained that no such interpretations properly exist at
all. For Justice Blackmun, the language of the rule as written is so clear that
there is but one possible meaning that can neither be expanded nor
constricted.
In addition to the majority's predilection for a strict reading of the rule,
the criteria by which the petitioners' actions were gauged also significantly
affected the outcome of the case. Apparently, Justice Blackmun had little
sympathy for the petitioners, for he questioned the propriety of their amend-
ment even before rendering an interpretation of the rule itself. He could not
rationalize why plaintiffs neglected to name Time specifically as the defend-
ant."' The tone of his inquiry was a subtle indication that the plaintiffs, and
more precisely their attorneys, would not be looked upon favorably.
The first issue addressed by the majority concerned the petitioners' argu-
ment that Fortune's status as a division of Time allowed application of the
"identity of interest" exception since institution of an "action against the
former constituted notice of the action to the latter, as a related entity."'' 4 5
The Court noted that the purpose of the exception is to avoid the application
of the statute of limitations when the party being added would suffer no
prejudice.' 46 Justice Blackmun, however, artfully managed to dodge the
identity of interest issue altogether by eloquently stating that even if the
Court were to adopt the concept, the facts would preclude its application in
the present context. Justice Blackmun maintained that notice may be im-
puted to a sufficiently related party only if the complaint has been timely
filed and notice given within the limitation period.147 He noted that neither
Fortune nor Time received notice within the statutory period as the sum-
mons and complaint were received four days after the period had expired.' 4 8
144. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2383. "We cannot understand why, in litigation of this as-
serted magnitude, Time was not named specifically as the defendant in the caption and in the
body of each complaint. This was not a situation where the ascertainment of the defendant's
identity was difficult for plaintiffs." Id.
The masthead of the May 31, 1982 issue of Fortune Magazine in question states at page 2:
FORTUNE (ISSN 0015-8259), May 31, 1982, Vol. 105, No. 11. Issued biweekly
by Time Inc., 3435 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, Cal. 90010 .... Principal offices:
Time & Life Building, Rockefeller Center, New York, N.Y. 10020 .... FORTUNE
is a registered trademark of Time Incorporated.
Id. at 2384 n.6.
145. Id. at 2384.
146. Id. The court of appeals in Schiavone v. Fortune, 750 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1984), rejected
the application of an identity of interest exception in this case.
147. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2384. "Timely filing of a complaint, and notice within the
limitations period ... permits imputation of notice to a subsequently named and sufficiently
related party." Id.
148. Id.
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Thus, adequate notice could not be imputed to Time by virtue of notice to
Fortune.
At the core of the majority's reasoning is the notion that the only proper
notice is that which occurs prior to the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions. As Justice Stevens' dissent points out, however, under rule 40) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may receive service of the
summons and complaint up to 120 days after the filing of the original com-
plaint. 149 Since the federal rules require only that notice be adequate, the
only notice petitioners were required to provide Time was that which a cor-
rectly named defendant would have received. Moreover, notice to such a
defendant should be sufficient under rule 40) if received within 120 days of
the original filing. In the dissent's view, since notice to Time was received
within this period, it should have been adequate. The majority, on the other
hand, reasoned that rule 4 was inapplicable since it dealt only with service of
process. 150
The Court further maintained that petitioners' amendment would not be
allowed to relate back to the date of the original filing because of the failure
to satisfy all four requirements of rule 15(c). 5 ' Specifically, the majority
held that since petitioners failed to amend within the statute of limitations
period their claim was barred. The Court reasoned, therefore, that the
amendment would not relate back because neither Fortune nor Time re-
ceived actual notice within the limitation period. Nevertheless, under rule
40) it is not necessary for defendants to receive actual notice prior to the
tolling of the statute for the action to retain its force and effect. As Justice
Stevens made clear, rule 15(c)'s imposition of a relation back deadline refers
not to the statute of limitations, but rather to the period mandated for com-
mencing the action against the proposed defendant. 152 The dissent main-
tained that the disputed period includes two components. The first is the
time for commencing the action by the filing of the complaint and the sec-
ond, the time in which the action "against him" must be carried out through
149. Id. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Rule 40) states:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120
days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was
required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period,
the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's
own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion. This subdivision shall not
apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to subdivision (i) of this rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 40).
150. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385.
151. Id.; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
152. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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service of process.' 53
Justice Stevens subsequently revealed an anomalous situation to which the
majority offered no convincing explanation. The majority stated that had
the initial complaint named "Fortune also known as Time, Inc.," it would
have been timely. Nevertheless, as the dissent noted, Time would have
known nothing different had the complaints named "Fortune, also known as
Time, Incorporated" than what it knew from the complaints as filed, with
their reference merely to "Fortune."' 54 As a matter of law, the correctly
named defendant could have legitimately received proper notice after the
limitation period. Agreeing with Judge Feinberg in Ingram, '5 5 Justice Ste-
vens could not rationalize the majority entitling a defendant added by
amendment to earlier notice than he would have received had the complaint
named him in the first instance.
In apparent response, the majority stated that it envisioned rule 15(c) as
emphasizing "the period provided by law for commencing the action
against" the defendant. 156 However, the rule's overriding purpose is to as-
sure that a proposed defendant will not be prejudiced in maintaining his
defense on the merits.'5 7 As previously described, the prejudice requirement
embodies the concept of preventing the defendant's loss of access to evi-
dence. "'5 8 In this respect, the majority in no way indicated that Time would
have suffered any prejudice had relation back of petitioners' amendment
been allowed. In fact, as Justice Stevens made clear, it was never argued that
Time or its agent was misled or confused by the caption on the com-
plaints. 15  Noting an additional requirement of rule 15(c), Justice Stevens
impliedly argued that Time Incorporated indeed knew or at least should
have known that, but for a mistake in identity, Time was the intended
defendant. 1
60
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2389.
155. See supra note 7.
156. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2385.
157. Id. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
159. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This lack of surprise or confu-
sion is readily apparent from the cover letter accompanying the summons and complaint re-
ceived by Time's agent and forwarded to Time Incorporated's law department: "Remarks:
Discrepancy in corporate title noted. Letter from Att. indicates that papers are for Time,
Incorporated as publisher of Fortune. Service was made by mail pursuant to Rule 4(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. (citations omitted).
160. See id. Justice Stevens saw the essence of the question as whether petitioners' com-
plaints was untimely despite the fact that they were filed prior to the tolling of the statute of
limitations, and that Time, Inc. had received adequate notice. In light of these considerations,
it was untenable to him how these complaints could be deemed untimely.
Moreover, the fact that Fortune is only a trademark and an internal division of Time only
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The purpose of rule 15(c) is to enable a plaintiff to correct pleading errors
after the statute of limitations has run if the correction will not prejudice the
defendant. This purpose seemingly is defeated by the majority's holding. It
is curious that the majority would embrace the rather obvious attempt of
Time, Incorporated to avoid culpability by raising a technical defense and
arguing that it had no idea that plaintiffs intended to sue the corporation. 161
The final argument propounded by Justice Stevens rests on the premise
that the four-part 15(c) relation back test applies only if the amendment is
one "changing the party against whom a claim is asserted."' 62 A party is
"changed" if the amendment alters the understanding of the identity of the
defendant. Thus, the relation back test is irrelevant if such an alteration fails
to occur. The dissent contended that in this case, the plaintiff's technical
correction did not change the understanding of the entity to be hailed before
the courts, 16 3 and that, therefore, the relation back test was inapplicable.' "
One can infer from the decision in Schiavone that the Court, without
reaching the merits of the plaintiffs' claim, viewed the prejudice to the de-
fendant in allowing relation back as outweighing the policy considerations
implicit in the purposes of rule 15(c)-those of liberalizing allowance of rela-
tion back of amendments to promote adjudication on the merits rather than
dismissal based on technical pleading flaws.' 6 5 The majority implied that
the potential prejudice to defendant, Time, superseded the merits of plain-
tiffs' claim of libel. It is almost as if Justice Blackmun regarded petitioners'
suit as mere pretense; for he questioned the petitioners' actions in "litigation
of this asserted magnitude." 166
Moreover, the Court implied that if the asserted irreparable harm were so
grave, the attorneys for plaintiffs should have expended the extra time, ef-
strengthens the argument that Time knew or should have known that it was plaintiff's in-
tended defendant. As illustrated supra note 159, the cover letter from Time's agent further
undercuts Time's defense.
161. There is authority which suggests, however, that notice must be received within the
statute of limitations to avoid depriving a new party of his right to invoke the statute of limita-
tions defense, thereby raising a question of procedural due process. Thomas v. Home Credit
Co., 133 Ga. App. 602, 607, 211 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1974); Sims v. American Casualty Co., 131
Ga. App. 461, 482, 206 S.E.2d 121, 135 (1974).
162. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 2388.
164. Id.
165. Additionally, the Court maintained that the policy considerations underlying the stat-
ute of limitations concept preempted relation back in this context. As previously stated, these
considerations most notably include the prevention of prejudice and judicial economy. Thus,
the Court necessarily implies that the goals of preventing prejudice to defendant and fostering
judicial economy should prevail. But, as also noted previously, the majority fails to identify
the specific prejudice likely to burden defendant Time.
166. See Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2383 (emphasis added).
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fort, and care to avoid making such an error. Agreeing with the district
court, the majority apparently lacked any sympathy for the plaintiffs because
it was their own attorneys who incurred the risk by filing suit so close to the
limitations deadline. In contrast, the Supreme Court in Conley favored deci-
sions on the merits and rejected such a strict approach to pleading. 167
To harmonize its decision with Conley, the Schiavone Court applied what
might properly be termed an "inexcusable neglect" analysis. This method of
analysis takes the view that a plaintiff's own inexcusable error may be con-
sidered in determining whether allowing relation back would prejudice a
proposed defendant. 16 8 Although never explicitly using this terminology,
Justice Blackmun appears to have adopted this concept and applied it in
Schiavone. The application of an inexcusable neglect or avoidable error
analysis here may be misplaced, however, for even a more diligent effort on
the part of the plaintiffs' attorneys may not have produced a more substan-
tively accurate complaint. It is true that Jacobs asserted that it is the plain-
tiff's responsibility to name the proper defendant. Nevertheless, as Justice
Stevens' dissent repeatedly noted, while technically the caption "Fortune
also known as Time, Inc." was the more accurate, it added nothing of
substance to the identity of the proper defendant. Hence, the dissent drew a
subtle but significant distinction between naming the proper defendant and
properly naming the defendant. Furthermore, the question arises as to what
constitutes "inexcusable" error and precisely what criteria will be
determinative.
An underlying consideration operating in this case concerns the Court's
deference to the procedure for promulgating the federal rules.' 6 9 Citing the
167. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. If Justice Stevens is correct in his analysis
of the plaintiffs' amendment, then the correction was merely a technical error and not one of
substance. Should the Court allow a plaintiff's technical error-one causing no cognizable
prejudice to the intended defendant-and prevent the plaintiff from fairly litigating his claim?
The Supreme Court in Conley thought not.
168. Bruce v. Smith, 581 F. Supp. 902, 906 (W.D. Va. 1984).
169. The present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by the Supreme
Court and adopted by Congress. Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410, 413 (8th Cir. 1955). Orig-
inally, courts professed inherent power to set their own rules. Later, legislatures began to
regulate judicial procedure, the notion being that authority to promulgate rules could be vested
in courts only by the legislature.
Subsequently, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 723b, 723c were passed on June 19, 1934, which conferred
upon the Supreme Court the authority to prescribe the rules of practice and procedure in all
civil actions in the district courts. This grant of power resulted in the promulgation and adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. The consequence is that today the
Supreme Court exerts tremendous influence over the rules of procedure in the United States
district courts.
The process of promulgating the Federal Rules, however, involved not only the Supreme
Court, but also the entire legal profession. Holtzoff, Participation of the Bar in Judicial Rule-
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district court's decision, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the Court should
not allow its policy preferences to influence a decision to change procedural
rules.' 7 ° He also noted that any possible doubt about the interpretation of
rule 15(c) should have been resolved by the Advisory Committee's 1966
Note on rule 15(c). 17 1 As elucidated in Justice Stevens' dissent, however,
though the majority relied on the interpretation of the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note, it ignored the viewpoint of the Committee's reporter, Professor
Kaplan,' 72 who offered perhaps the most informed contemporary insight
into the Committee's intent.
V. RULE 15(C)-PRECEDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR APPLICATION OF
RULE 15(c)
The most obvious effect of the Court's decision in Schiavone is that the
actual number of cases in which relation back will be allowed will decrease.
Relation back will no longer be permitted in cases where a plaintiff attempts
to amend his complaint after the tolling of the statute of limitations if it has
given inadequate notice to the proposed defendant during the limitations pe-
riod. Justice Stevens recognized the impact of the majority's decision, not-
ing that the purpose of the 1966 amendment to rule 15(c) was to increase the
number of cases permitting relation back. The majority holding frustrates
this purpose. 173
A second ramification of the Schiavone holding is that the law in at least
three federal jurisdictions concerning relation back of amendments is effec-
tively overruled. The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits must now alter their
practice of allowing the period for rule 15(c) notice to include the time avail-
able for service of process. Such notice must now be tendered within the
statutory limitations period.
Schiavone may also be construed as narrowing the category of harmless
pleading errors. Should one devise a list of such errors, misnaming a defend-
Making, 3 F.R.D. 165 (1943). The Supreme Court appointed the Advisory Committee to
prepare a draft of the Rules. Bar committees were formed in each judicial district and com-
ments were solicited from bar members in these jurisdictions. This process consisted of nu-
merous drafts and commentary-induced redrafts, with the Supreme Court ratifying the final
product. Holtzoff, 3 F.R.D. at 166.
Thus, in Schiavone the Court arguably deferred to this burdensome process by hesitating to
second guess the original Advisory Committee and Court promulgating Rule 15(c).
170. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2382 (citing Schiavone, 750 F.2d at 15).
171. Id. at 2385.
172. Id. at 2388-89 n.4. "It is curious that the majority, in relying on the Advisory Com-
mittee interpretation, ignores the reporter's almost contemporaneous understanding." Id. at
2389.
173. Id. at 2389.
1987]
Catholic University Law Review
ant by a trademark or internal corporate division name will be conspicuously
absent. It is no longer considered harmless error for a plaintiff to name a
technically improper party, convey nonprejudicial notice to the new party,
and seek to amend his error after the statute of limitations.
The final effect of Schiavone concerns the operation of the identity of inter-
est exception. Since Justice Blackmun failed to offer a definitive statement
on the doctrine, the conflict remains unresolved among the federal circuits.
While some jurisdictions perceive that an identity of interest that exists be-
tween the named defendant and the intended defendant fosters notice to the
latter, others, such as the Third Circuit in Schiavone, reject this approach.
Although Justice Blackmun was careful to avoid explicitly embracing either
view, it is apparent that, at least in this case, he thought identity of interest
inapplicable. '74
In addition to the more obvious implications of the Schiavone ruling, sev-
eral more subtle ramifications are foreseeable. First, the language the major-
ity used to question the form of plaintiffs' complaint.7 5 implies that a
plaintiff will find it more difficult to amend a complaint pursuant to rule
15(c) if he has made avoidable pleading errors. The positive impact of this
judicial predilection for precision is that attorneys will now be more inclined,
where possible, to mitigate the risk of being barred by the statute of limita-
tions by avoiding filing too close to the deadline. The Court also attempts to
foster more careful pleading by essentially penalizing plaintiffs for con-
ducting inadequate research. Second, the Court's decision weakens its own
propositions in Conley v. Gibson and Foman v. Davis that mistakes by coun-
sel causing no prejudice to the defendant should not preclude proper deci-
sions on the merits and that the rules should be liberally construed to assure
just and speedy litigation. Justice Stevens pointed out that the majority art-
fully steered clear of this approach that the Court previously considered
appropriate. "'
Finally, should the interpretation of rule 15(c) set forth by the Schiavone
Court be as implicitly contrary to the intent of constitutional due process as
Justice Stevens suggests, it is foreseeable that the Advisory Committee may
again suggest amending the rule to clarify even further whether proper rule
15(c) notice includes time for service of process. Such an event may be
unlikely, however, because the 1966 amendment was not spurred by a defini-
tive interpretation of the rule by the Supreme Court, but rather by sporadic
application of the rule in the lower federal courts.
174. See id. at 2384.
175. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
176. Schiavone, 106 S. Ct. at 2389 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Rule 15(c) serves as the guide for determining "when an amendment of a
pleading changing the party against whom a claim is asserted (including an
amendment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant) shall
'relate back' to the date of the original pleading."' 17 7 All four of the rule's
requirements must be satisfied before relation back will be allowed.
The United States Supreme Court, in Schiavone v. Fortune, settled a major
conflict among courts of appeals concerning the interpretation of the rule's
requirement that notice to the party to be added must occur "within the
period provided by law for commencing the action against him."' 7 8 The
Court concluded that this period does not include reasonable time for service
of process, thereby altering the law in several jurisdictions.
As the relation back doctrine of rule 15(c) is balanced against the statute
of limitations policies of prevention of prejudice and judicial economy, and it
is not in this case specified what particular prejudice was likely to result, it
follows that the Schiavone decision is based predominantly upon concerns of
judicial economy. In an effort to prevent further litigation concerning the
"period provided by law" question, the Supreme Court has set the standard
that hereafter must be applied. Regardless of the apparent injustice of the
application of this standard to this particular case, the decision provides a
much needed clarification of an imprecisely written rule.
Nathan M. Gundy, III
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note, 39 F.R.D. at 82.
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
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